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Abstract—Ciphertexts of an order-preserving encryption
(OPE) scheme preserve the order of their corresponding plain-
texts. However, OPEs are vulnerable to inference attacks that
exploit this preserved order.
At another end, differential privacy has become the de-facto
standard for achieving data privacy. One of the most attractive
properties of DP is that any post-processing (inferential) com-
putation performed on the noisy output of a DP algorithm does
not degrade its privacy guarantee.
In this paper, we intertwine the two approaches and propose
a novel differentially private order preserving encryption scheme,
OP. Under OP, the leakage of order from the ciphertexts is
differentially private. As a result, in the least, OP ensures a
formal guarantee (specifically, a relaxed DP guarantee) even in
the face of inference attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to intertwine DP with a property-preserving
encryption scheme. We demonstrate OP’s practical utility in
answering range queries via extensive empirical evaluation on
four real-world datasets. For instance, OP misses only around
4 in every 10K correct records on average for a dataset of size
∼ 732K with an attribute of domain size ∼ 18K and  = 1.
Index Terms—Differential Privacy, Order Preserving Encryp-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequent mass data breaches [8], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]
of sensitive information have exposed the privacy vulnera-
bility of data storage in practice. This has lead to a rapid
development of systems that aim to protect the data (even
in the event of a whole-system compromise) while enabling
statistical analysis on the dataset, both in academia [24],
[38], [62], [69], [92] and industry [11], [9], [66], [96], [10].
Encrypted database systems that allow query computation
over the encrypted data is a popular approach in this regard.
Typically such systems rely on property-preserving encryption
schemes [28], [29] to enable efficient computation. Order-
preserving encryption (OPE) [70], [83], [90] is one such
cryptographic primitive that preserves the numerical order of
the plaintexts even after encryption. This allows actions like
sorting, ranking, and answering range queries to be performed
directly over the encrypted data. As a result, OPEs require
minimal changes to existing database systems and thereby,
can be easily adopted in practice [20], [52], [64], [68], [77],
[80], [81].
However, this efficiency of encrypted databases comes at
a cost – such systems are vulnerable to inference attacks
[31], [46], [57], [58], [60], [74], [75], [88] that can reveal
the plaintexts with good accuracy. Most of these attacks are
inherent to any property-preserving encryption scheme – they
do not leverage any weakness in the cryptographic security
guarantee of the schemes but are rather carried out based
on just the preserved property. For example, the strongest
cryptographic guarantee for OPEs (IND-FA-OCPA, see Sec.
II-B) informally states that only the order of the plaintexts will
be revealed from the ciphertexts. However, inference attacks
[57], [58], [60] can be carried out by leveraging only this
ordering information. The basic principle of these attacks is to
use auxiliary information to estimate the expected distribution
of the plaintexts and then correlate it with the encrypted data
based on the underlying property being preserved [51].
At another end, differential privacy (DP) has steadily be-
come the de-facto standard for achieving data privacy. DP
provides a rigorous guarantee of privacy for individuals in
a dataset and is defined with respect to a privacy parameter
 > 0 where lower the value of , greater is the privacy
guaranteed. DP has enjoyed widespread adoption in practical
settings including usage by government agencies [17], [82],
[97] as well as major commercial organizations like Alibaba
[101], Microsoft [45], Apple [54], Google [49], [50] and
Uber [67]. An appealing property of DP is that any post-
processing (inferential) computation performed on the noisy
output of a DP algorithm does not incur additional privacy
loss.
In this work, we aim to answer the following question:
Is it possible to leverage the properties of DP for
providing a formal security guarantee for OPEs
even in the face of inference attacks?
To this end, we propose a novel differentially private order
preserving encryption scheme, OP. Recall that standard OPE
schemes are designed to reveal nothing but the order of
the plaintexts. Our proposed scheme, OP, ensures that this
leakage of order is differentially private. In other words, the
cryptographic guaratantee of OPEs is bolstered with a layer
of DP guarantee (specifically, a relaxed definition of DP as
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discussed in the following paragraph). As a result, even if
the cryptographic security guarantee of standard OPEs proves
to be inadequate (in the face of inference attacks), the DP
guarantee would continue to hold true. We illustrate this idea
by the following example. Consider two medical datasets, X
and X ′, that differ in a single row (see Defn. II.4) correspond-
ing to an individual patient. An adversary who has access to
the ciphertexts of X (encrypted under OP) would, in the
very least, fail to distinguish it from X ′. Stated otherwise, the
adversary would fail to identify an individual patient’s record
with certainty (Defn. II.4). Intuitively, the reason behind is
DP’s resilience to post-processing computations as discussed
above. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
intertwine DP with a property-preserving encryption scheme.
A. Brief Overview of Key Ideas
The standard DP guarantee requires any two pairs of input
data to be indistinguishable from each other (see Sec. II-A)
and is generally catered towards answering statistical queries
over the entire dataset. However, in our setting we require the
output of the DP mechanism to retain some of the ordinal
characteristics of its input – the standard DP guarantee is not
directly applicable to this case. Hence, we opt for a natural
relaxation of DP– we require that only pairs of data points that
are “close” to each other should be indistinguishable. Specif-
ically, the privacy guarantee is heterogeneous and degrades
linearly with the `1 distance between a pair of data points.
It is denoted by -dLDP (or -dDP in the central model of
differential privacy, see Sec. II-A for details). This relaxation
is along the lines of dχ-privacy [40] and subsequent related
literature (see Sec. VII).
DP guarantee inherently requires randomization – this en-
tails an inevitable loss of utility, i.e., some pairs of output
might not preserve the correct order of their respective inputs.
In order to reduce the instances of such pairs, OP offers the
flexibility of preserving only a partial order of the plaintexts.
Specifically, a (user specified) partition is defined on the input
domain and the preserved order is expected at the granularity
of this partition. The output domain is defined by a numeric
encoding over the intervals of the partition and all the elements
belonging to the same interval are mapped to the correspond-
ing encoding for the interval (with high probability). Due to
the linear dependence of the DP guarantee (and consequently,
the ratio of output probabilities) on the distance between the
pair of inputs, lower is the number of intervals in the partition,
higher is the probability of outputting the correct encoding in
general (see Sec. III-A and Sec. VI-B). OP preserves the
order over this encoding. The reason why this results in better
utility in the context of encrypted databases is illustrated by
the following example. The typical usecase for OPE encrypted
databases is retrieving a set of records from the outsourced
database that belong to a queried range. Suppose a querier
asks for a range query [a, b] and let P be a partition that
covers the range with k intervals {[s1, e1], · · · , [sk, rk,1]} such
that s1 < a < e1 and sk < b < ek. A database system
encrypted under OP and instantiated with the partition P
will return all the records that are noisily mapped to the
range [s1, ek] (since the order is preserved at the granularity
of P). Thus, the enquirer has to pay a processing overhead
of fetching extra records, i.e., the records that belong to the
ranges {[s1, a−1], [b+1, ek]}. However, if k < b−a, then with
high probability it would receive all the correct records in [a, b]
which can be decrypted and verified (see Sec. IV-C). To this
end, we first propose a new primitive, OPc, that enables order
preserving encoding under -dLDP. The encryption scheme,
OP, is then constructed using the OPc primitive and a OPE
scheme (see Sec. III-B).
The primitive OPc can be of independent interest in the
local differential privacy (LDP, see Sec. V) setting. Based on
the choice of the partition, OPc can be used for answering
several classes of queries at a higher utility than that of
the corresponding state-of-the-art LDP schemes under the
standard -LDP guarantee. One such class consists of ordinal
queries where the partition over the input domain can in fact
be a manifestation of the query at hand. For example, suppose
the dataset consist of the annual sales figures of different
clothing firms and the goal is to group them according to their
respective deciles. Thus, the partition can then be defined as an
equi-depth binning where each bin (interval) contains a tenth
of the total population. Consider another example where the
goal is to group a dataset of audiences of TV shows based on
their age demographic - [< 20], [21 − 40], [41 − 60], [> 60].
Here again, the aforementioned binning of the input domain
can define the partition to be used for OPc. It is also
important to note that the dLDP privacy guarantee is amenable
to this case, as one would want to report the intervals correctly
but the adversary should not be able to distinguish between
the values belonging to the same interval. For instance, the
information whether a firm is a top selling one is less sensitive
than its actual sales figures; similarly whether a person is
young or middle-aged is less sensitive than their actual age.
In addition to ordinal queries, the OPc primitive can also
be used for answering a variety of queries like frequency
estimation, mean estimation and range queries.
B. Contributions
Novel primitive that combines order preserving encryp-
tion and differential privacy. In this paper, we propose a
novel -dDP (a distance based relaxation of the DP guarantee)
order preserving encryption scheme, OP. OP satisfies a
new security guarantee, IND-FA-OCPA, (see Sec. IV) that
bolsters the cryptographic guarantee of a OPE scheme (IND-
FA-OCPA) with a layer of -dDP guarantee. This allows the
scheme to enjoy a formal guarantee of -dDP, in the least,
even in the face of inference attacks while still preserving
some ordering information of the plaintexts. Thus OP could
be used for secure data analytics in settings where the -dDP
guarantee is acceptable and the application can tolerate certain
loss in utility. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to intertwine DP with a property-preserving encryption
scheme. OP is based on a novel -dLDP order preserving
encoding primitive, OPc, that can be of independent interest
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in the LDP setting.
Practical for real-world usage. We present a construction
for the OPc primitive (and hence, OP) and demonstrate
its practicality via extensive evaluation on four real-world
datasets. Specifically, OP misses only 4 in every 10K correct
records on average for a dataset of size ∼ 732K with an
attribute of domain size 18K and  = 1. The associated
overhead of processing extra records is also low – the number
of extra records returned is just 0.3% of the total dataset size
on average. The OPc primitive can be used to answer ordinal
queries with 94.5% accuracy for a dataset of size ∼ 38K, and
an attribute of domain size ∼ 230K for  = 1. Additionally,
OPc achieves 6× lower error than the corresponding state-of-
the-art -LDP technique for frequency estimation for  = 0.1.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces the necessary background.
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a quantifiable measure of the stability
of the output of a randomized mechanism in the face of
changes to its input data. There are two models of differential
privacy used in practice, local and central.
The local model consists of a set of individual data owners
and an untrusted data aggregator; each individual perturbs their
data using a (local) DP algorithm and sends it to the aggregator
which uses these noisy data to infer certain statistics of the
entire dataset. Thus, the LDP model allows gleaning of useful
information from the dataset without requiring the data owners
to bestow their trust on any third-party entity. The LDP
guarantee is formally defined as follows.
Definition II.1 (Local Differential Privacy, LDP). A random-
ized algorithm M : X → Y is -locally differentially private
(or -LDP), if for any pair of private values x, x′ ∈ X and
any subset of output, T ⊆ Y we have
Pr
[M(x) ∈ T ] ≤ e · Pr[M(x′) ∈ T ] (1)
-LDP guarantees the same level of protection for all pairs
of private values. However, as discussed in the preceding
section, in this paper we adopt an extension of LDP which
uses the `1 distance between a pair of values to customize
heterogeneous (different levels of) privacy guarantees for
different pairs of private values.
Definition II.2 (Distance-based Local Differential Privacy,
dLDP). A randomized algorithm M : X → Y is -distance
based locally differentially private (or -dLDP), if for any pair
of private values x, x′ ∈ X such that |x − x′| ≤ t, and any
subset of output T ⊆ Y , we have
Pr[M(x) ∈ T ] ≤ et · Pr[M(x′) ∈ T ] (2)
The above definition is equivalent to the notion of metric-
based local differential privacy [21], [40] where the metric
used is `1-norm.
In the central differential privacy (CDP) model, a trusted
data curator collates data from all the individuals and stores it
in the clear in a centrally held dataset. The curator mediates
upon every query posed by a mistrustful analyst and enforces
privacy by adding uncertainty (for example, random noise) to
the answers of the analyst’s queries before releasing them.
In this paper, we use a standard relaxation of differential
privacy [27] in the CDP model that allows for an extra additive
term δ.
Definition II.3 (Central Differential Privacy, CDP). A ran-
domized algorithm M : Xn 7→ Y satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy (DP) if for all O ⊆ Y and for all adjacent datasets
X,X ′ ∈ Xn it holds that
Pr[M(X) ∈ T ] ≤ e · Pr[M(X ′) ∈ T ] + δ (3)
The notion of adjacent inputs is application-dependent, and
typically means that X and X ′ differ in a single element
(that corresponds to the contributions of a single individual).
Particularly in our setting, the equivalent definition of the
distance based relaxation of differential privacy in the CDP
model is given as follows.
Definition II.4 (Distance-based Central Differential Privacy,
dDP). A randomized algorithm M : Xn → Y is (, δ)-
distance based centrally differentially private (or (, δ)-dDP),
if for any pair of datasets X and X ′ such that they differ in
a single element, xi and x′i where |xi − x′i| ≤ t, i ∈ [n], and
any subset of output T ⊆ Y , we have
Pr
[M(X) ∈ T ] ≤ et · Pr[M(X ′) ∈ T ] (4)
We define X and X ′ as described above to be t-adjacent.
Also, for the rest of the paper, the notation -dDP implies the
(, 0)-dDP guarantee (δ = 0).
The following theorem formalizes dDP’s resilience to post-
processing computations.
Theorem 1 (Post-Processing [47]). Let M : Xn 7→ Y be
a (, δ)-dDP algorithm. Let g : Y 7→ Y ′ be an arbitrary
randomized mapping. Then g ◦M : Xn 7→ Y ′ is also (, δ)-
dDP.
B. Order Preserving Encryption
In this section, we discuss the necessary definitions in the
context of OPEs.
A OPE scheme is formally defined as follows.
Definition II.5 (Order Preserving Encryption [83]). An order
preserving encryption (OPE) scheme E = 〈K,E,D〉 is a tuple
of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms such that:
• Key Generation (K). The key generation algorithm takes
as input a security parameter κ and outputs a secret key
(or state) S.
• Encryption (E). The encryption algorithm inputs a dataset
X of size n ∈ N, and an order Γ (any permutation of
{1, · · · , n}) and works as follows:
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1) Set S0 ← K(κ)
2) For ∀i ∈ [n], run (Si, yi)← E(Si−1, xi,Γ, i)
• Decryption (D). The decryption algorithm uses the secret
key to recover the plaintext as xi ← D(Si−1, yi).
Additionally, we have
∀i, j ∈ [n], xi > xj =⇒ yi > yj (5)
The utility of Γ in the above definition is discussed later in
this section.
The strongest formal guarantee for a OPE scheme is in-
distinguishability against frequency-analyzing ordered chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-FA-OCPA). We present the following
two definitions in connection to this.
We start with the notion of randomized orders.
Definition II.6. (Randomized Order [70]) Let X =
{x1, · · · , xn} be a data sequence. For a randomized order
Γ = {γ1, · · · , γn}, where γi ∈ [n] and i 6= j =⇒ γi 6= γj ,
for all i, j, of sequence X , it holds that
∀i, j (xi > xj =⇒ γi > γj) ∧ (γi > γj =⇒ xi ≥ xj)
Informally, for a plaintext data sequence X of size n, a
randomized order is a permutation of the plaintext indices
{1, · · · , n} which are ordered according to a sorted version
of X . This is best explained by an example: consider a data
sequence of size 7 given by X = {76, 9, 9, 40, 15, 76, 77}.
Thus, a randomized order for X can be either of the following:
• Γ1 = {7, 6, 1, 4, 5, 3, 2}
• Γ2 = {7, 6, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3}
• Γ3 = {7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 3, 2}
• Γ4 = {7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 2, 3}
It is so because the order of the two instances of 76 and 9
does not matter in the sorted version of X .
Definition II.7 (IND-FA-OCPA [83], [70]). An order-
preserving encryption scheme E = (K,E,D) has indistinguish-
able ciphertexts under frequency-analyzing ordered chosen
plaintext attacks if for any PPT adversary APPT:∣∣∣Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1) = 1]− Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ)
(6)
where κ is a security parameter, negl(·) denotes a negligible
function and GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b) is the random variable denoting
APPT’s output for the following game:
Game GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b)
1) (X0, X1)← APPT where |X0| = |X1| = n and X0 and
X1 have at least one common randomized order
2) Select Γ∗ uniformly at random from the common ran-
domized orders of X0, X1
3) S0 ← K(κ)
4) For ∀i ∈ [n], run (Si, yb,i)← E(Si−1, xb,i,Γ∗, i)
5) b′ ← APPT(yb,1, · · · , yb,m) where b′ is APPT’s guess for b
APPT is said to win the above game iff b = b′.
Informally, this guarantee implies that nothing other than the
order of the plaintexts, not even the frequency, is revealed from
the ciphertexts. Stated otherwise, the ciphertexts only leak a
randomized order of the plaintexts (randomized orders do not
contain any frequency information since each value always
occurs exactly once) which is determined by the input order
Γ in Defn. II.5. In fact, if Γ itself happens to be a randomized
order of the input X then, the randomized order leaked by the
corresponding ciphertexts is guaranteed to be Γ. For example,
for X = {76, 9, 9, 40, 15, 76, 77} and Γ = {7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 2, 3},
we have y7 > y1 > y6 > y4 > y5 > y2 > y3. Thus, the
IND-FA-OCPA guarantee ensures that two sequences with a
common randomized order but different plaintext frequencies
are indistinguishable. For example, in the aforementioned
game GAPPTFA-OCPA(·), APPT would fail to distinguish between
the plaintext sequences X0 = {76, 9, 9, 40, 15, 76, 77} and
X1 = {22, 13, 12, 14, 14, 14, 29} both of which share the
randomized order Γ∗ = {7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 2, 3}.
Note that although the notion of IND-FA-OCPA was first
introduced by Kerschbaum et al. [70], the proposed definition
suffered from a subtle flaw which was subsequently rectified
by Maffei et al. [83]. The above definition, hence, follows
from the one in [83] (denoted by in IND-FA-OCPA∗ in [83]).
Additionally, Defn. II.5 in our paper corresponds to the notion
of augmented order-preserving encryption scheme (denoted by
OPE∗ in [83]) which is crucial for the above security defini-
tion. The augmented OPE scheme is in fact a generalization
of the standard OPE scheme (the only difference being the
encryption algorithm E has an additional input, Γ).
III. PROPOSED PRIMITIVES
In this section, we discuss our proposed primitives. First, we
introduce our primitive for -dLDP order preserving encod-
ing, OPc. Next, we describe our -dLDP order preserving
encryption scheme (OP) that is based on the OPc primitive.
A. -dLDP Order Preserving Encoding (OPc)
OPc is a randomised mechanism that encodes its input
while maintaining some of its ordinal characteristics. If X =
[s, e] is an input domain, then a k-partition P on X denotes
a set of k non-overlapping intervals Xi = (si, ei] 1, sj+1 =
ej , i ∈ [k], j ∈ [k − 1] such that
⋃k
i=1 Xi = X . For example,
for X = [1, 100], P = {[1, 10], (10, 20], · · · , (90, 100]}
denotes a 10-partition. Let Xˆ denote the domain of partitions
defined over X . For brevity, we denote a partition as a set of
the end points ei for each of its intervals. For instance, from
the above example, P = {10, 20, · · · , 90, 100}. Additionally,
let O = {o1, · · · , ok}, oi < oi+1, i ∈ [k − 1] represent the
output domain where oi is the corresponding encoding for the
interval Xi and let P(x) = oi denote that x ∈ Xi. Referring
back to our example, if O = {1, 2, · · · , 10}, then P(45) = 5.
Definition III.1 (-dLDP Order Preserving Encoding, OPc).
A -dLDP order preserving encoding scheme, OPc : X ×
Xˆ × R>0 7→ O is a randomized mechanism such that d
1) |O| = k
1The first interval X1 = [s, e1] is a closed interval.
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2) For all x ∈ X and o′ ∈ O/Tx, ∃o ∈ Tx such that
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = o] >
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = o′] (7)
where Tx =

{o1, o2} if i = 1
{ok−1, ok} if i = k
{oi−1, oi, oi+1} otherwise
for oi := P(x)
3) For all x, x′ ∈ X , o ∈ O such that |x−x′| ≤ t, we have
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = o] ≤
et · Pr[OPc(x′,P, ) = o] (8)
where P ∈ Xˆ is a k-partition.
The first property in the above definition signifies the
flexibility of the OPc primitive to provide only a partial
ordering guarantee. For instance, in our above example k =
10 < |X | = 100. P = O = X denotes the default case where
effectively no partition is defined on the input domain and
P(x) = x, x ∈ X trivially. Note that due to randomization
(required for to the dLDP guarantee), OPc is bound to incur
some errors in the resulting numerical ordering of its outputs.
To this end, the second property guarantees that the noisy
output is most likely to be the either the correct one or the
ones immediately next to it. For instance, OPc(45,P, ) is
most likely to fall in {4, 5, 6}. This ensures that the noisy
outputs still retain sufficient ordinal characteristics of the
corresponding inputs. Finally, the third property ensures that
the primitive satisfies -dLDP. Note that,  = ∞ represents
the trivial case OPc(X,P,∞) = P(X).
Construction of OPc
In this section, we describe a construction for the OPc
primitive (Alg. 1).
The algorithm is divided into two stages. In the first stage
(Steps 1-3), it computes the central tendency (a typical value
for a distribution) [93], di, i ∈ [k], of each of the intervals of
the given k-partition P . Specifically, we use weighted median
[44] as our measure for the central tendency where the weights
are determined by a prior on the input distribution, f . This
maximizes the expected number of inputs that are mapped to
the correct encoding, i.e., x is mapped to P(x). In the context
of encrypted databases, the data owner has access to the entire
dataset in the clear (Sec. IV-C). Hence, they can compute the
exact input distribution, f , and use it to instantiate the OPc
primitive (for OP). In the LDP setting, f can be estimated
from domain knowledge or auxiliary datasets. In the event
such a prior is not available, f is assumed to be the uniform
distribution (di reduces down to the median in this case).
In the second stage (Steps 4-5), the output probabilities are
computed such that the probability of x outputting the i-th
encoding, oi, is inversely proportional to its distance from the
i-th central tendency, di. Specifically, we use the exponential
mechanism [63], [47] (Eq. (9)).
Lemma 2. Alg. 1 satisfies Eq. 7 from Defn. III.1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of OPc
Parameters: P - A partition {[s1, e1]〉, · · · , (sk, ek]} over X
f - Estimate input distribution over X , its
default value is set to be the uniform
distribution
O - Output domain {o1, · · · , ok}
 - Privacy parameter
Input: x - Number to be encoded via OPc
Output: o - Output encoding;
Stage I: Computation of central tendency for each interval
1: for i ∈ [k]
2: di = Weighted median of the interval (si, ei] where
f gives the corresponding weights
3: end for
Stage II: Computation of the output probabilities
4: for x ∈ X :
5: for i ∈ [k]
6:
px,i =
e−|x−di|·/2
k∑
j=1
e−|x−dj |·/2
(9)
B px,i = Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oi
]
7: end for
8: px = {px,1, · · · , px,k} B Output (encoding) probability
distribution for x
9: end for
10:
11: o ∼ px B Encoding drawn at random from the distribution px
12: Return o
Lemma 3. Alg. 1 satisfies -dLDP.
The proof of the above lemmas are in App. X-C. Thus, Alg.
1 gives a construction for the OPc primitive.
Now, note that larger is the size of each interval, 1) smaller
is the size of the output space |O|, 2) larger is the distance
between x ∈ Xi and dj , j ∈ [k], j 6= i in general. Thus, this
leads to higher probability of outputting the correct encoding.
For a dataset X ∈ Xn and partition P ∈ Xˆ , let O˜ =
{o˜i|o˜i = OPc(xi,P, ) where xi ∈ X}. Hence, if any
given range [a, b] is covered by a relatively small number of
intervals in P , then with high probability the set of records
corresponding to the encodings {o˜|o˜ ∈ O˜ ∧ o˜ ∈ [P(a),P(b)]}
will contain most of the correct records (as shown by our
experimental results in Sec. VI-B).
B. -dDP Order Preserving Encryption (OP)
As discussed in Sec. I, the -dDP order preserving encryp-
tion (OP) scheme is an encryption scheme that bolsters the
cryptographic guarantee of a OPE scheme with an additional
dDP guarantee. Here, we detail how our proposed primitive
OPc can be used in conjunction with a OPE scheme (Defn.
II.5) to form a OP scheme.
Definition III.2 (-dDP Order Preserving Encryption, OP).
A -dDP order preserving encryption scheme, OP, is com-
posed of a OPE scheme, E , that satisfies the IND-FA-OCPA
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guarantee, and the OPc primitive and is defined by the
following three algorithms:
• Key Generation (K). Uses K from the OPE scheme to
generate a secret key S.
• Encryption (E). The encryption algorithm inputs data
sequence X ∈ Xn, an order Γ, a partition P ∈ Xˆ , and
the privacy parameter . The encryption works as follows:
1) Set S0 ← K(κ)
2) For ∀i ∈ [n], compute (Si, yi) ← E(Si−1, o˜i,Γ, i)
where o˜i ← OPc(xi,P, /2)
• Decryption (D). The decryption algorithm uses D to get
back o˜i ← D(Si−1, yi).
Key Idea. The key idea of the above definition is that
the OPE scheme is applied to the output of the OPc
primitive. Thus, ciphertexts encrypted under OP preserve
the order of the corresponding encodings as output by the
OPc primitive. Referring back to our example, if X =
{76, 9, 9, 40, 15, 76, 77} and its corresponding encodings are
O˜ = {8, 1, 2, 4, 2, 8, 8}, then the encryption of X under OP
preserves the order of O˜.
In other words, since a OPE scheme preserves the exact
order of its input data sequence by definition, the utility of OP
(in terms of the preserved ordering information) is determined
by the underlying OPc primitive. This is formalized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Utility Theorem). If, for a given partition P ∈ Xˆ
and for all x, x′ ∈ X such that x > x′ we have
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) ≥ OPc(x′,P, )] ≥ α (10)
for α ∈ [0, 1], then for a OP scheme instantiated on such a
OPc primitive, we have
Pr
[
E(x,S,Γ,P, ) ≥ E(x′,S,Γ,P, )
] ≥ α (11)
where S← K(κ) and Γ = {1} trivially.
The proof of the above theorem follows directly from Defns.
II.5 and III.2.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the formal security analysis of
OP. First, we provide a new cryptographic security definition
for OP (Sec. IV-A) followed by a technique to amplify
the guarantee (Sec. IV-B). Next, we present a mechanism
for improving the utility of OP in the context of encrypted
databases (Sec. IV-C). Additionally, as shown by a growing
body of work [76], [89], [61], we note that these cryptographic
security definitions are inadequate to capture the effects of
real-world inference attacks. Hence we conclude our discus-
sion with the description a formal model for analysing the
inference attacks on OPEs in the snapshot model (Sec. IV-D).
A. New Security Definition for OP
Here, we present a novel security guarantee for OP,
namely indistinguishable ciphertexts under frequency-
analyzing -dDP ordered chosen plaintext attacks
(IND-FA-OCPA). We start with an intuitive explanation of
the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee and its associated security
game GAPPTIND-FA-OCPA .
For GAPPTIND-FA-OCPA , the adversary, APPT, chooses four input
sequences of equal length X00, X01, X10 and X11 such
that P0(X00) and P1(X10) share at least one randomized
order where X00, X01 ∈ Xn0 , X10, X11 ∈ Xn1 , P0 ∈ Xˆ0
and P1 ∈ Xˆ1. Additionally, {X00, X01} and {X10, X11}
are t-adjacent (Defn. II.4). The challenger then selects
two bits {b1, b2} uniformly at random and returns the
corresponding ciphertext for the input sequence Xb1b2 .
APPT then outputs their guess for the bits and wins
the game if they are able to guess either of the bits
successfully. Thus, informally the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee
states that APPT cannot distinguish among the four
input sequences. We illustrate this using the following
example: consider X00 = {22, 13, 12, 14, 14, 14, 29}, X10 =
{76, 9, 9, 48, 15, 76, 77} , X01 = {22, 13, 12, 14, 14, 11, 29}
and X11 = {78, 9, 9, 48, 15, 76, 77} where {X00, X10} share
a randomized order, {7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 2, 3}, and {X00, X01} and
{X10, X11} are 3-adjacent. For the ease of understanding and
simplicity, we consider the default case of P0 = O0 = X0
and P1 = O1 = X1. This means that P0(X00) = X00 and so
on. If only OPc were to be used to encode the above data
sequences, then only the pairs {X00, X01} and {X10, X11}
would be indistinguishable to the adversary (albeit an
information theoretic one) because of the -dDP guarantee
(Defn. II.4). However, there would be no formal guarantee on
the pairs {X01, X11}, {X01, X10}, {X00, X11}, {X00, X10}.
Similarly, if we were to use just the OPE scheme, then
only the pair {X00, X10} would be indistinguishable
for APPT as the rest of the pairs do not share any
randomized order. OP, on the other hand, makes all 6 pairs
{X00, X01}, {X00, X11}, {X00, X10}, {X01, X11}, {X01, X10},
{X11, X10} indistinguishable for APPT. This happens because
OP essentially preserves the order of a -dDP scheme.
The security guarantee is formally defined as follows.
Definition IV.1 (IND-FA-OCPA). An encryption scheme
E = (K,E,D) has indistinguishable ciphertexts under
frequency-analyzing -dDP ordered chosen plaintext attacks
if for any PPT adversary, APPT, and security parameter, κ,
we have:
Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b1, b2) = (c1, c2)] ≤
et · Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b′1, b′2) = (c1, c2)] + negl(κ) (12)
where b1, b2, b′1, b
′
2, c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1)} and GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b1, b2)
is the random variable indicating the adversary APPT’s output
for following security game:
Game GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, b1, b2)
1) (X00, X01, X10, X11)← APPT where
a) X00, X01 ∈ Xn0 and X10, X11 ∈ Xn1
b) P0(X00) and P1(X10) have at least one common
randomized order where P0 ∈ Xˆ0 and P1 ∈ Xˆ1
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c) {X00, X01} and {X10, X11} are t-adjacent
(Defn. II.4)
2) S← K(κ)
3) Compute O˜0 ← OPc(X00,P0, /2) and O˜1 ←
OPc(X10,P1, /2).
4) If O˜0 and O˜1 do not have any common randomized
order, then return ⊥. Else
a) Select two uniform bits b1 and b2 and a randomized
order Γ∗ common to both O˜0 and O˜1.
b) If b2 = 0, compute Yb1b2 ← E(O˜b1 ,S,Γ∗,Ob1 ,∞)
Else, compute Yb1b2 ← E(Xb11,S,Γ∗,Pb1 , /2).
5) (c1, c2) ← APPT(Yb1,b2) where c1(c2) is APPT’s guess
for b1(b2)
APPT is said to win the above game if b1 = c1 or b2 = c2.
Theorem 5. The proposed encryption scheme, OP satisfies
the IND-FA-OCPA - security guarantee.
Proof Sketch. The proof of the above theorem follows
directly from the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee of the OPE
scheme and the fact that OP satisfies /2-dDP guarantee.
The full proof is presented in App. X-A.
Let NG(X) = {X ′|X ′ ∈ Xn and {X,X ′} are indistin-
guishable to APPT under guarantee G}. Additionally, we as-
sume P = X for the ease of understanding. Thus, in a nutshell,
the -dDP guarantee allows a pair of sequences {X,X ′} to
be indistinguishable2 only if they are t-adjacent (for relatively
small values of t). Referring back to our example, we have
X01 ∈ N-dDP(X00) and X11 ∈ N-dDP(X10).
On the other hand, under the IND-FA-OCPA guaran-
tee, {X,X ′} is indistinguishable3 to APPT only if they
share a common randomized order. For instance, X10 ∈
NIND-FA-OCPA(X00).
In addition to the above cases, the IND-FA-OCPA guaran-
tee allows a pair of sequences {X,X ′} to be indistinguishable4
for APPT if {X,X ′}
1) do not share a randomized order
2) are not adjacent,
but there exists another sequence X ′′ such that
1) {X ′, X ′′} are adjacent, i.e. X ′ ∈ N-dDP(X ′′)
2) {X,X ′′} share a randomized order, i.e., X ′′ ∈
NIND-FA-OCPA(X).
From our aforementioned example, we have X11 6∈
NIND-FA-OCPA(X00) and X11 6∈ N-dDP(X00). But still, X11 ∈
NIND-FA-OCPA(X00) since X11 ∈ N-dDP(X10) and X10 ∈
NIND-FA-OCPA(X00). Thus, formally
NIND-FA-OCPA(X) =
⋃
X′′∈NIND-FA-OCPA(X)
N-dDP(X ′′) (13)
2the ratio of their output distributions are bounded by et, holds against an
information theoretic adversary as well
3computational indistinguishability [53]
4Formally given by Eq. 12 which is structurally similar to that of the
IND-CDP guarantee [87] which is a computational differential privacy guar-
antee.
Since, trivially X ∈ NIND-FA-OCPA(X) and X ∈ N-dDP(X),
we have NIND-FA-OCPA(X) ⊇ NIND-FA-OCPA(X) and
NIND-FA-OCPA(X) ⊇ N-dDP(X).
Key Insight. The key insight of the IND-FA-OCPA security
guarantee is that the OPE scheme preserves the order of the
outputs of a -dDP mechanism. As a result, the adversary
is now restricted to only an -dDP order leakage from
the ciphertexts. Hence, even if the security guarantee of
the OPE layer is completely broken, the outputs of OP
would still satisfy -dDP due to Thm. 1. Referring to the
example mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in the very
least input pairs {X00, X01} and {X10, X11} will remain
indistinguishable under all inference attacks. Thus, OP is the
first encryption scheme to satisfy a formal security guarantee
against all possible inference attacks and still provide some
ordering information about the inputs.
B. Privacy Amplification
Recent work have shown that the privacy guarantee of the
noisy reports in the LDP model can be amplified by roughly
a factor of
√
n when viewed in the CDP model [48], [43],
[25]. This is achieved by anonymizing the noisy reports via
shuffling. Specifically, a result by Erlingsson et al. [48] states
that a permutation-invariant algorithm satisfying -LDP will
satisfy (O(
√
log(1/δ)/n), δ) DP guarantee. In what follows,
we prove the extension of this result to the -dLDP guarantee.
Lemma 6. Let X,X ′ ∈ Xn have k common randomized
orders. Let pi represent a random permutation. Then, pi(X)
and pi(X ′)) also have k common randomized orders.
Proof. Let Γ be a randomized order that is common to both
X and X ′. Then clearly the order {pi−1(γ1), ..., pi−1(γn)} is
a randomized order common to pi(X) and pi(X ′).
We illustrate the above lemma with the following example.
For X = {76, 9, 9, 48, 15, 76, 77}, its randomized order Γ =
{7, 1, 6, 4, 5, 2, 3} and a permutation pi = {3, 6, 7, 1, 4, 2, 5},
pi−1(Γ) = {3, 4, 2, 5, 7, 6, 1} is a randomized order for
pi(X) = {9, 76, 77, 76, 48, 9, 15}.
Now, let us consider a slight modification to the OP
scheme where an additional shuffling step (Step 2) is intro-
duced in the encryption algorithm, E,pi , as follows:
1) Set S0 = S.
2) Select a random permutation pi and compute pi(X) =
{xpi1 , · · · , xpin}.
3) For ∀i ∈ [n], compute (Si, yi) ← E(Si−1, o˜i,Γ, i)
where o˜i ← OPc(xpii ,P, /2).
Next, we define a new security guarantee for the afore-
mentioned modified OP scheme that accounts for the extra
shuffling step (Steps 3-5) and extends the guarantee to be
amenable to the (, δ)-dDP guarantee as follows
Definition IV.2 (IND-FA-OCPA,δ). An encryption scheme
E,δ = (K,E,δ,D) has indistinguishable ciphertexts under
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frequency-analyzing (, δ)-dDP ordered chosen plaintext at-
tacks if for any PPT adversary, APPT and security parameter,
κ, we have:
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA,δ(κ, b1, b2) = (c1, c2)] ≤
et · Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA,δ(κ, b′1, b′2) = (c1, c2)]+ δ′ (14)
where b1, b2, b′1, b
′
2, c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1)}, |δ′ − δ| ≤ negl(κ) and
GAPPTFA-OCPA,δ(κ, b1, b2) is the random variable indicating the
adversary APPT’s output for the following game:
Game GAPPTFA-OCPA,δ(κ, b1, b2)
1) (X00, X01, X10, X11)← APPT where
a) X00, X01 ∈ Xn0 and X10, X11 ∈ Xn1
b) P0(X00) and P1(X10) have at least one common
randomized order where P0 ∈ Xˆ0 and P1 ∈ Xˆ1
c) {X00, X01} and {X10, X11} are t-adjacent
2) S← K(κ)
3) Select a random permutation pi.
4) Compute O˜0 ← OPc(pi(X00),P0, /2) and O˜1 ←
OPc(pi(X10),P1, /2).
5) If O˜0 and O˜1 do not have any common randomized
order, then return ⊥. Else
a) Select two uniform bits b1 and b2 and a randomized
order Γ∗ common to both O˜0 and O˜1.
b) If b2 = 0, compute Yb1b2 ← E(O˜b1 ,S,Γ∗,Ob1 ,∞).
Else, compute Yb1b2 ← E(pi(Xb11),S,Γ∗,Pb1 , /2).
6) (c1, c2)← APPT(Yb1,b2)
The final privacy amplification (by roughly a factor of
√
n)
theorem is as follows.
Theorem 7 (Privacy Amplification). Let OPc
satisfy 0-dLDP in the LDP model. Then, for any
integer n > 1, 0, δ > 0, OP :=
〈
OPc, 〈K,E,pi,D〉
〉
satisfies IND-FA-OCPA,δ security guarantee where
 ≤ 1
√
2n log(1/δ) +n1(e
1−1) for 1 = 2e20(e0−1)/n.
Proof. Lem. 6, Thm. 5 and Lem. 11 proves that OP :=〈
OPc, 〈K,E,pi,D〉
〉
satisfies the IND-FA-OCPA guaran-
tee. The rest of the proof follows directly from the proof
of Thm. 7 in [48] based on the fact that the properties of
monotonicity, quasi-convexity, triangle inequality and privacy
amplification (Lem. 3 and 4 in [48]) by sampling extends
straightforwardly to -dDP.
Note that for the purposes of Thm. 7, we assume that
the data points are suitably anonymized (for example, all the
associated data, if any, should be anonymized via standard
encryption scheme).
C. Improved Utility for Encrypted Databases
Problem Setting. In the context of encrypted databases,
typically a data owner has access to the entire database in
the clear and encrypts it before outsourcing it to an untrusted
server. The queriers of the encrypted databases are authorized
entities with access to the secret keys. In fact, in many practical
settings the data owner themselves is the querier [51].
The most popular use case for databases encrypted under
OPEs is retrieving the set of records belonging to a queried
range. However, due to randomization, encryption under OP
leads to loss in utility. Specifically in the context of range
queries, it might miss some of the correct data records and
return some incorrect ones. For the former, constraining OP
to maintain only a partial order is found to be helpful (as
discussed in Sec. III-A). The problem of returning incorrect
records can be mitigated by piggybacking every ciphertext
encrypted under OP with another ciphertext that is obtained
from encrypting the corresponding plaintext under a standard
encryption scheme [5], E ′ := 〈K′,E′,D′〉. The modified
scheme works as follows:
• Key Generation (K†). This algorithm generates a pair of
keys (S,K) where S← K(κ) and K ← K′(κ)
• Encryption (E†). The encryption algorithm works as
follows:
1) Set S0 ← K(κ)
2) For ∀i ∈ [n], compute (Si, yi0, yi1) where
o˜i ← OPc(xi,P, /2), (Si, yi0)← E(Si−1, o˜i,Γ, i),
yi1 ← E′(K,xi)
• Decryption (D†). The decryption algorithm decrypts both
the ciphertexts to obtain (xi, oi) as oi ← D(Si−1, yi0)
and xi ← D′(K, yi1).
Thus, after receiving the returned records from the server,
the querier can decrypt {yi1} and discard the irrelevant ones.
The cost of this optimization is the overhead of processing
the irrelevant records and the extra storage space for {yi1}.
However, in this age of cloud services, outsourced storage
space ceases to be a bottleneck [1].
Note that the aforementioned modified scheme still upholds
the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee owing to the semantic security
of the encryption scheme E ′.
Range Query Protocol. First, we briefly discuss the protocol
for answering range queries for a OPE scheme that satisfies
the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee (see [70] for details). Recall that
every ciphertext is unique for such a OPE scheme. Hence, a
querier has to maintain some state information for every plain-
text. Specifically, if Y = {y1, · · · , yn} denotes the correspond-
ing ciphertexts for an input dataset X = {x1, · · · , xn}, then
the querier stores the maximum and minimum ciphertext in
Y that corresponds to the plaintext xi, (denoted by maxx(xi)
and min( xi), respectively). Thus, for answering a given range
query [a, b], the querier asks for all the records in Y that belong
to
[
minE(a),maxE(b)
]
. In OP, the OPE scheme is applied
to the output of the OPc primitive. Thus, now the querier asks
for all the encrypted records in the set Y ′ = {〈y′i0, y′i1〉|i ∈
[n] and y′i0 ∈
[
minE(P(a)),maxE(P(b)
]}.
D. Formal Model for Analyzing Inference Attacks
As discussed in Sec. I, OPE schemes are vulnerable to
inference attacks. Most of these attacks are inherent to any
OPE scheme – they do not leverage any weakness in the
cryptographic security guarantee of the schemes but instead
utilize the ordering information of the plaintexts which is
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revealed as per the definitional requirements of the scheme. In
other words, these attacks are beyond the scope of the standard
cryptographic security guarantees (like IND-FA-OCPA) for
OPEs and hence, their effects are not captured directly by
the cryptographic security guarantees.
Hence, in this section we present a formal model to sys-
tematically study the effect of such inference attacks. The
goal of this exercise is to provide an intuitive insight into
OP’s improved protection against these attacks. To this end,
we concentrate on the “snapshot” attack model (the adversary
only obtains a onetime copy or snapshot of the encrypted data
store [51]) for the ease of exposition. The proposed formal
model creates a privacy leakage profile for the plaintext bits
based on the revealed ordering information and adversary’s
auxiliary knowledge.
Model Description. We assume the input domain to be
discrete, and finite and w.l.o.g denote it as X = [0, 2m−1].
Additionally, let D represent the true input distribution and
X = {x1, · · · , xn} be a dataset of size n with each data point
sampled i.i.d from D. We model our adversary, APPT, to have
access to the following data:
1) Auxiliary knowledge about a distribution, D′, over the
input domain, X . In practice, this can be derived from
domain knowledge or auxiliary (public) datasets the
adversary has access to.
2) The ciphertexts, C, corresponding to X which represent
the snapshot of the encrypted data store.
The adversary’s goal is to recover as many bits of the plain-
texts as possible. Let X(i), i ∈ [n] represent the plaintext
in X with rank [6] i and let X(i, j), j ∈ [m] represent
the j-th bit for X(i). Additionally, let b(i, j) represent the
adversary’s guess for X(i, j). Let L be a n × m matrix
where L(i, j) = Pr
[
X(i, j) = b(i, j)
∣∣D,D′] represent the
probability that APPT correctly identifies the j-th bit of the
plaintext with rank i. Hence, the matrix L helps us in analyzing
the bitwise information leakage from C to APPT.
Adversary’s Approach. APPT’s goal is to produce their
best guess for every X(i, j). Hence, given APPT’s auxiliary
knowledge about the distribution, D′, the strategy with the
least probabilistic error is as follows:
b(i, j) = arg max
b∈{0,1}
{PrD′
[
X(i, j) = b
]}, i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
=
{
0 if ED′
[
X(i, j)
] ≤ 1/2
1 if ED′
[
X(i, j)
]
> 1/2
(15)
Next, we compute L when is X is encrypted under an OPE
scheme that satisfies the IND-FA-OCPA security guarantee.
This analysis formalizes what APPT can learn from just the
order of the plaintexts (that is leaked by C by definition).
Theorem 8. If X is encrypted under an OPE scheme that
satisfies the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee, then for all i ∈ [n], j ∈
[m] we have
L(i, j) =
∑
s∈Sj
b(i,j)
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
where x ∼ D, and Sjb = {s|s ∈ X and its j-th bit sj = b}.
The bitwise leakage matrix, L, for the case when X is
encrypted under a OP scheme is given as follows.
Theorem 9. If X is encrypted under a OP scheme, then for
all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] we have
L(i, j) =
∑
s∈Sj
b(i,j)
PrD
[
x = s
](∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
]·
Pr
[
OPc(s,P, ) = v]/PrD∗[o = v] )
where O˜(r) denotes the encoding with rank r, r ∈ [n], P ∈
Xˆ , o ∼ D∗, and D∗ : X 7→ O represents the distribution of
the encoding OPc(x,P, ), x ∼ D which is given as
PrD∗
[
v
]
=
∑
x∈X
PrD
[
x
] · Pr[OPc(x,P, ) = v], v ∈ O
The proof of the above theorems are presented in App. X-B.
We numerically evaluate L for both a OPE scheme and a OP
scheme on real world datasets using these theorems in Sec. VI.
Note that the aforementioned assumption of an adversary
with a prior is made only to capture a real-world instan-
tiation of inference attacks on OPEs. This assumption has
no bearing whatsoever on our primary security guarantee of
IND-FA-OCPA (Defn. IV.1).
V. LDP MECHANISMS USING OPC
The OPc primitive can be of independent interest in the
LDP setting. Depending on the choice of the partition P over
the input domain X , OPc can be used to answer different
types of queries with high utility. In this section, we describe
how to use OPc to answer two such queries.
Problem Setting. For the rest of this section, we assume the
standard LDP setting with n data owners, DOi, i ∈ [n] each
with a private data xi.
A. Ordinal Queries
OPc can be used to answer queries in the LDP setting
that require the individual noisy outputs to retain some of the
ordinal characteristics of their corresponding inputs. One class
of such queries include identifying which q-quantile does each
data point belong to. This constitutes a popular class of queries
for data domains like annual salaries of employees, annual
sales figures of commercial firms and test scores of students.
In this case, partition P is defined by dividing the input domain
into q equi-depth intervals using an estimate of the input
distribution, f . In the case such an estimate is not available,
a part of the privacy budget can be first used to compute
this directly from the data [79]. For another class of queries,
the partition can be defined directly on the input domain
based on its semantics. For example, the domain of age can
be divided into intervals {[1, 20], [21, 40], [41, 60], [61, 100]}
based on categories like “youth”, “senior citizens”. Once the
partition is defined, each data owner uses the OPc primitive
to report their noisy encoding.
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B. Frequency Estimation
Here, we discuss the default case of the OPc primi-
tive where the partition is same as the input domain, i.e.,
P = O = X . Under this assumption, we can construct
a mechanism for obtaining a frequency oracle in the LDP
setting under the dLDP guarantee. The full mechanism is
described in Alg. 2 and is discussed as follows. Given a
privacy parameter, , each data owner, DOi, i ∈ [n], reports
o˜i = OPc(xi,X , ) to the untrusted data aggregator. Next, the
data aggregator performs non-negative least squares (NNLS)
as a post-processing inferencing step on the noisy data to
compute the final frequency estimations. NNLS is a type
of constrained least squares optimizations problem where the
coefficients are not allowed to become negative. That is, given
a matrix A and a (column) vector of response variables Y,
the goal is to find X such that
arg min
x
‖A ·X−Y‖2
subject to X ≥ 0
where || · ||2 denotes Euclidean norm. The rationale behind
this inferencing step is discussed below.
Lemma 10. W.l.o.g let X = {1, · · · ,m} and let Y be the
vector such that Y(i), i ∈ [m] indicates the count of value i
in the set {o˜1, · · · , o˜n} where o˜i = OPc(i,X , ). Given,
A(i, j) = Pr
[
OPc(i,X , ) = j], i, j ∈ [m] (16)
the solution X for the following equation
A ·X = Y (17)
gives an unbiased frequency estimator (X(i) is the unbiased
estimator for value i).
The proof of the above lemma is presented in App. X-D.
Thus by the above lemma, X is an unbiased frequency
estimator. However, it is important to note that the solution X
is not guaranteed to be non-negative. But, given our problem
setting, the count estimates are constrained to be non-negative.
Hence, we opt for an NNLS inferencing. When the exact
solution X = A−1 · Y is itself non-negative, the estimator
obtained from the NNLS optimization is identical to the exact
solution. Otherwise, the NNLS optimization gives a biased
non-negative estimator that results in minimal least square
error. The resulting frequency oracle can be used to answer
other queries like mean estimation and range queries5.
Note that in the presence of an additional shuffling server
between the data owners and the aggregator, the privacy
amplification results from [48] (similar to Thm. 7) can also
be applied here.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation results for the
proposed primitives, OP and OPc. Specifically, we answer
the following three questions:
5In the LDP setting, this refers to statistical range query, i.e., the count of
the records that belong to a queried range.
Algorithm 2 Frequency Estimation
Parameter:  - Privacy parameter
Data Owner
1: Set P = X
2: for i ∈ [n]
3: DOi computes o˜i = OPc(xi,X , ) and sends it to the data
aggregator
4: end for
Data Aggregator
5: Data aggregator performs NNLS optimization as follows
A ·X = Y where
A(i, j) = Pr[OPc(i,X , ) = j], i, j ∈ [m]
Y(i) = Count of value i in {o˜1, · · · , o˜n}
6: Return X
• Q1: Does OP retrieve the queried records with high
accuracy?
• Q2: Is the processing overhead of OP reasonable?
• Q3: Does OPc result in high utility for answering
statistical queries in the LDP setting?
Evaluation Highlights:
• OP retrieves almost all the records of the queried range.
For instance, OP only misses around 4 in every 10K
correct records on average for a dataset of size ∼ 732K
with an attribute of domain size ∼ 18K and  = 1.
• The overhead of processing extra records for OPE is low.
For example, for the same dataset as above, the number
of extra records processed is just 0.3% of the total dataset
size on average for  = 1.
• OPc can answer several of classes queries in the LDP
setting with high utility. For instance, OPc can answer
ordinal queries with 94.5% accuracy for a dataset of
size ∼ 38K, an attribute of domain size ∼ 240K and
 = 1. Additionally, OPc achieves 6× lower error than
the corresponding state-of-the-art -LDP technique for
frequency estimation for  = 0.1.
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets. We use the following datasets:
1) PUDF [2]. This is a hospital discharge data from Texas.
Specifically, we use the 2013 PUDF data and the at-
tribute PAT ZIP (7,31,188 records of patient’s 5-digit
zipcode from the domain [70601, 88415]).
2) Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System
(SPARCS) [3]. This is a hospital inpatient discharge
dataset from the state of New York. This dataset has
25,31,896 records and we use the length of stay (do-
main [1, 120]) attribute for our experiments.
3) Salary [7]. This dataset is obtained from the Kaggle
repository and contains the compensation for San Fran-
cisco city employees. Specifically, we use the attribute
BasePay (domain [1000, 230000]) from the years 2011
(35,707 records) and 2014 (38,122 records).
4) Adult [18]. This dataset is obtained from the UCI
repository and is derived from the 1994 Census dataset.
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Fig. 1: Accuracy Analysis of OP in the Context of Encrypted Databases
The dataset has 32,561 records and we use the attribute
Age (domain [1, 100]) for our experiments.
5) Population [4]. This is a US Census Bureau dataset that
lists the annual estimates of the resident population by
age and sex. We use the data for gender male for Puerto
Rico for the years 2011 and 2019.
Datasets Adult and SPARCS have small and dense domains
while the datasets PUDF and Salary have larger and sparse
domains.
Metrics. We evaluate Q1 and Q2 using the metrics – relative
percentage of missing records, ρM =
#missing records
#correct records %,
and the percentage of extra records processed relative
to the dataset size, ρE = #extra records#records in dataset%,
respectvely. For evaluating ordinal queries, we use
σk = % of points with |P(x) − o˜x| = k where P(x)
and o˜x denote the correct and noisy encoding for x,
respectively. For frequency and mean estimation (Figs. 2b
and 2c), we measure the absolute error |c− c˜| where c is the
true answer and c˜ is the noisy output. For Fig. 2d, we use the
error metric |c − c˜|/k where k is the size of the query. We
report the mean and s.t.d of error values over 100 repetitions
for every experiment.
Configuration. All experiments were conducted on a
Mac laptop with Intel Core i5 processor, and 8GB memory
running OS X Mojave (v10.14.6). We used Python version
3.7.6. For the encrypted database setting for OP (Fig. 1),
we set δ = 1100·n (for the (, δ)-dDP guarantee)) where n is
the size of the dataset. Due to lack of space, we present the
results for all only two datasets – 1 dense (Adult, SPARCS)
and 1 sparse (PUDF, Salary) – for the experiments in Fig.
1. Unless stated otherwise, the default settings are  = 1,
equi-depth partitioning of sizes |P| = 122 for PUDF, |P| = 8
for SPARC, |P| = 10 for Adult, and |P| = 70 for Salary.
The range queries are chosen uniformly at random from the
respective domains. We use the data from Salary the year
2011 as an auxiliary dataset for Fig. 2a.
B. Experimental Results
We present our experimental results in this section.
Utility of OP
In this section, we evaluate Q1 and Q2 by computing the
efficacy of OP in retrieving the queried records of a range
query. Recall, that a OPE scheme preserves the exact order
of the plaintexts. Thus, the loss in accuracy (ordering infor-
mation) arises solely from OP’s use of the OPc primitive.
Hence first, we study the effect of the parameters of the OPc
primitive.
We start with the privacy parameter,  (Figs. 1a and 1b). We
observe that OP achieves high utility even at high levels of
privacy owing to the privacy amplification from Thm. 7. For
example, OP misses only about 2% of the correct records
(i.e., ρM = 2%) for the PUDF dataset (Fig. 1a) on average
even for a very low value of  = 10−3 (i.e., the ratio of
the output distributions of two datasets that are 1000-adjacent
is bounded by e and an additive term, δ, according to the
(, δ)-dLDP guarantee). The associated processing overhead
is also reasonable – the size of the extra records retrieved,
ρE , is around 1% of the total dataset size on average. Next,
we observe that as the value of  increases, both the number of
missing and extra records drop. For instance, for  = 1 we have
ρM = 0.04%, i.e., only 4 in every 10K correct records are
missed on average. Additionally, the number of extra records
processed is just 0.3% of the total dataset size on average.
We observe similar trends for the SPARC dataset (Fig. 1b)
as well. However, the utility for the SPARC dataset is lower
than that for the PUDF dataset. For instance, ρM = 10% and
ρE = 40% for  = 10−3 for the SPARC dataset. This is
so because the ratio of the domain size (120) and partition
size (8) for the SPARC dataset is smaller than that for the
PUDF dataset (domain size ∼ 18K, |P| = 122). As a result,
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Fig. 2: Accuracy Analysis of OPc in the LDP setting
the individual intervals for the SPARC dataset are relatively
small which results in lower utility (as explained in Sec. III-A).
Next, we study the effect of the size of the partition (number
of intervals) on OP’s utility. As expected, we observe that
for the Adult dataset, decreasing the partition size from 20
to 5 decreases ρM from 5% to 0.2% (Fig. 1c). However, this
increases the number of extra records processed – ρE increases
from 0.8% to 7%. Similar trends are observed for the Salary
dataset (Fig. 1d).
Recall that with OP, if [a, b] is the desired range query,
then a querier asks for the records in [P(a),P(b)] instead.
One way of further reducing ρM can be including records
from some of the intervals preceding P(a) and following
P(b). Specifically, the querier can ask for the records in
[max(o1, oa − r),min(ob + r, ok))] where oa := P(a) and
ob := P(b). However, the cost is increase in ρE . We study
this trade-off in Figs. 1e and 1f. For instance, for the Salary
dataset, including records from 2 extra neighboring intervals
drops ρM from 1% to 0%. However, ρE increases from 0.4%
to 1.7%. The increase in ρE is more significant for the Adult
dataset. The reason behind this is that the domain size for
Adult is small and the dataset is dense. On the other hand,
Salary has a larger and sparse domain.
Another way for improving utility is to answer a workload
of range queries at a time. Recall, that under OP, queries
can be made only at the granularity of the partition. Thus,
if a queried range [a, b] is much smaller than [P(a),P(b)],
then the querier has to pay the overhead of processing extra
records. This cost can be reduced in the case of a workload of
range queries where multiple queries fall within [P(a),P(b)]
(records that are irrelevant for one query might be relevant
for some other in the workload). Additionally, the number
of missing records for the query [a, b] is also reduced if
records from the neighboring intervals of [P(a),P(b)] are also
included in the response (owing to the other range queries
in the workload). We present the empirical results for this
in Figs. 1g and 1h. For the SPARC dataset, we observe
that ρM and ρE drop from 0.9% to 0.1% and 4% to 0.2%,
respectively as the size of the workload is increased from 1 to
20. Additionally, we note that this effect is more pronounced
for SPARC than for PUDF. This is because, the domain of
PUDF is larger and hence, the probability that the queried
ranges in the workload are close to each other is reduced.
Note. Encrypted databases typically build indexing structures
like B+ trees [33] over the attribute encrypted under OPE
(equivalently, OP) for query efficiency. Thus, the major
change in performance at the server side for OP is in terms of
the volume of the records returned. The querier, on the other
hand, needs to decrypt all the returned records (specifically,
{yi1}, see Sec. IV-C). However, decryption is in general an
efficient operation. For instance, the decryption of 1 million
ciphertexts encrypted under AES-256 GCM mode requires less
than 3 minutes in our experimental setup.
Utility of OPc in the LDP Setting
In this section, we evaluate Q3 by studying the utility of
the OPc primitive in the LDP setting.
First, we consider the case of ordinal queries and study the
following two specific queries. For the Adult dataset, we define
an equi-length partition P = {[1, 10], [11, 20], · · · , [91, 100]}
over the domain and our query of interest is: Which age group
(as defined by P) does each data point belong to?. For the
Salary dataset, we define an equi-depth partition of size 10
over the domain and our query of interest is: Which decile does
each data point belong to?. Our results are reported in Fig. 2a.
The first observation is that OPc reports the correct encodings
with good utility. For instance, for  = 1, σ0 = 94.5% and
σ1 = 5.5% for the Salary dataset. The corresponding values
for the Adult dataset are σ0 = 85% and σ1 = 15%. Another
interesting observation is that for low values of , the utility
for the Salary dataset is significantly higher than that for
the Adult dataset. Specifically, for  = 0.1, σ0 = 90% and
σ0 = 35% for the Salary and Adult datasets, respectively. The
reason for this is two fold. Firstly, we use an auxiliary dataset
for Salary to compute the weighted medians for measuring
the of central tendencies. On the other hand, we do not use any
auxiliary dataset for Adult and use the median of each interval
as our measure for central tendency. Secondly, the domain size
of Salary (230K) is relatively large compared to the number
of intervals (10) which results in higher utility (as explained
in Sec. III-A).
Fig. 2b shows our empirical results for using OPc for
frequency estimation. Baseline1 denotes the state-of-the art
frequency oracle [100] satisfying the standard -LDP guaran-
tee. We observe that OPc achieves significantly lower error
than Baseline1. For instance, the error of OPc is 6× lower
than that of Baseline1 for  = 0.1. This gain in utility is due
to OPc’s relaxed -dLDP guarantee.
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Fig. 3: Numerical Analysis of the Bitwise Leakage Matrix, L
From Fig. 2c, we observe that the frequency oracle designed
via OPc can be used for mean estimation with high utility.
Here Baseline2 refers to the state-of-the-art protocol [45] for
mean estimation for the -LDP guarantee. We observe that for
 = 0.1, OPc achieves ∼ 40× lower error than Baseline2.
Another interesting observation is that OPc’s frequency
oracle gives better accuracy for a range query of size k than k
individual point queries (Fig. 2d). For instance, a range query
of size 20 gives 5× lower error than 20 point queries. The
reason behind this is that the output distribution of OPc in
this case is the bell curve centered at the input x. Hence, with
high probability x either gets mapped to itself or some other
point in its proximity. Thus, the probability for accounting for
most copies of x is higher for the case of answering a range
query x ∈ [a, b] than for answering a point estimation for x.
Numerical Analysis of the Bitwise Leakage Matrix, L
In this section, we numerically evaluate the bit leakage
matrix L (Fig. 3) presented in Sec. IV-D. For this, we use
the data from the Population dataset for the year 2019 as
the true input distribution, D, and the data from the year
2011 is considered to be the adversary’s auxiliary distribu-
tion, D′. We consider the dataset size to be 200 and the
number of bits considered is 7 (domain of age is [1, 100]).
Additionally, the partition P for the OPc primitive is set to
be P = O = X = [1, 100]. As shown in Fig. 3, we observe
that the probability of successfully recovering the plaintext
bits is significantly lower for OP as compared to that of
a OPE scheme. Additionally, as expected, the probability of
the adversary’s success decreases with decreasing value of 
(due to increase in randomization). For instance, the average
probability of success for the adversary for bit 4 reduces from
0.77 in the case of OPEs (Fig. 3a) to 0.62 and 0.51 for  = 1
(Fig. 3b) and  = 0.1 (Fig. 3c), respectively, for OP.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly discuss the related literature.
Relaxation of DP. The dLDP guarantee is equivalent
to the notion of metric-based LDP [21] where the metric
used is `1-norm. Additionally, metric-LDP is a generic form
of Blowfish [65] and dχ-privacy [40] adapted to LDP. Few
other works have also [37], [102], [23], [41], [63], [99]
modelled the data domain as a metric space and scaled the
privacy parameter between pairs of elements by their distance.
Differential Privacy and Cryptography. A growing
number of work has been exploring the association between
differential privacy and cryptography. One such line of
work proposes to allow a DP leakage of information for
gaining efficiency in cryptographic protocols [85], [26],
[55], [39], [98]. A parallel line of work involves efficient
use of cryptographic primitives for differentially private
functionalities [95], [19], [32], [43].
VIII. DISCUSSION
OP is the first direction towards integrating OPEs and
DP. Here, we discuss several avenues for future research.
Support for Non-ordinal Data. Currently, -dLDP
(equivalently dDP) provides a semantically useful privacy
guarantee only for data domains that have a naturally
defined order. A possible future direction can be exploring
how to extend this guarantee for non-ordinal domains (like
categorical data). One such way could be associating the
categories of the non-ordinal domain with some ordinal
features like popularity [63] and defining the guarantee w.r.t
to these ordinal features instead.
Extension to Other Related Cryptographic Security
Guarantees. The current scheme can be trivially extended to
the IND-OCPA security guarantee [34], [91] for OPEs by
replacing Defn. III.2 with a OPE scheme that satisfies IND-
OCPA guarantee instead. Exploring connections with order
revealing encryption schemes [36], [78], [42] and modular
OPEs [84], [35] is also an interesting future direction. The
property of partial order preserving can provide protection
against certain inference attacks. For example, some attacks
require access patterns for uniformly random range queries
[59] or knowledge about the volume of every range query
[57]. This is clearly not possible with OP as only queries at
the granularity of the chosen partition are permitted. Hence,
another future direction could be formalizing this security
gain parameterized on the choice of the partition. A related
path to explore here could be studying connections with the
existing notion of partially order preserving encoding POPE
proposed by Roche et. al [94]. A recent line of work has
focused on providing formal guarantees against some specific
types of attacks in the context of encrypted databases [56],
[73], [71], [22]. Our model is distinct from all the above
mentioned approaches. Additionally, since the dDP guarantee
holds regardless of the type of inference attacks, it would
be interesting to see if it can be combined with the above
approaches for a stronger formal guarantee or better efficiency.
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Compromised Querier. In the context of a database
encrypted under a OPE scheme, a querier has access only
to the records that precisely belong to the queried range.
However, in our setting the querier might know the values
of some records that fall outside the queried range (Sec.
IV-C). This might lead to additional leakage, when compared
to the case of a OPE encrypted database, in the event the
querier is compromised. One way to prevent this is to use
an attribute-based encryption scheme [30] for E ′ where the
decryption is possible only if the record belongs to the
queried range.
Extension of LDP Mechanisms. The performance of
the algorithms presented in Sec. V could be improved by
borrowing techniques from the existing literature in LDP.
For example, the partition for OPc could be learnt from
the workload factorization mechanism from [86]. In another
example, a B-ary tree could be constructed over the input
domain using OPc for answering range queries [72].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel -dDP (a distance based
relaxation of the DP guarantee) order preserving encryp-
tion scheme, OP. OP satisfies a novel security guarantee,
IND-FA-OCPA, that bolsters the cryptographic guarantee of
a OPE scheme with a layer of -dDP guarantee. This allows
the scheme to enjoy a formal guarantee of -dDP, in the
least, even in the face of inference attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to intertwine differential
privacy with a property-preserving encryption scheme. Our
experimental results show that OP achieves high utility on
real-world datasets.
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X. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Intuition. The intuition of the proof is as follows.
Recall that there are four input sequences the adversary
has to distinguish among. If the adversary is able to guess
bit b1 correctly (with non-trivial probability), it is akin to
breaking the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee of OPEs. Similarly,
if the adversary is able to guess bit b2 correctly, (with non
trivial probability) it would imply the violation of the -dDP
guarantee.
The proof is structured as follows. First, we prove that OP
satisfies /2-dDP (or (/2, 0)-dDP following the notation in
Definition II.4). The rest of the proof follows directly from this
result and the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee of the OPE scheme.
Lemma 11. Let M be a mechanism that
1) inputs a dataset X ∈ Xn
2) outputs O˜ = {o˜1, · · · , o˜n} where for all i ∈ [n],P ∈
Xˆ , o˜i ← OPc(xi,P, /2)
Then, M satisfies /2-dDP.
Proof. Let X,X ′ ∈ Xn be t-adjacent. Specifically, let xi 6=
x′i, i ∈ [n]. For brevity, we drop P and the privacy parameter
/2 from the notation OPc(·).
Pr
[M(X) = O˜]
Pr
[M(X ′) = O˜] =
∏n
j=1 Pr
[
OPc(xj) = o˜j
]∏n
j=1 Pr
[
OPc(x′j) = o˜j
]
=
∏n
j=1,j 6=i Pr
[
OPc(xj) = o˜j ]∏n
j=1,j 6=i Pr
[
OPc(xj) = o˜j ]
× Pr
[
OPc(xi) = o˜i]
Pr
[
OPc(x′i) = o˜i
]
≤ e t2 [ From Eq. 8 of Definition III.1]
This concludes our proof.
Now, note that O˜b1 ∈ Onb1 . Thus, OPc(O˜b1 ,Ob1 ,∞) =
O˜b1 . As a result, E(S, O˜b1 ,Γ∗,Ob1 ,∞) (Step 4b) is
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equivalent to running E(S, Xb10,Γ∗,Pb1 , ) := 〈O˜b1 ←
OPc(Xb10,Pb1 , /2),E(O˜b1 ,S,Γ∗)〉. Thus, from Defn. II.7,
if
∣∣∣Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)]−Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) =
(c1, c2)
]∣∣∣ ≥ negl(κ), then another PPT adversary, A′PPT, can
use APPT to win the GAPPTIND-FA-OCPA(·) game which leads to a
contradiction. Hence, we have∣∣∣Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)]
−Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(κ) (18)
Without loss of generality, let us assume
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)] ≤
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)] (19)
Thus, from Eqs. (18) and (19), we have
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)] ≤
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)]+ negl(κ) (20)
From Theorem 1 and Lemma 11,
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)] (21)
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)] (22)
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)] (23)
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)] (24)
Now from (20) and (23), we have,
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)]+ negl(κ) (25)
Using Eqs. (19) and (24), we have
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 0) = (c1, c2)
]
(26)
From Eqs. (22) and (20), we have
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)] ≤
e
t
2 Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)]+ negl′(κ) (27)
[negl′(κ) = e
t
2 · negl(κ) which is another negligible function]
Eqs. (22) and (25) give us
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)]| ≤
etPr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)] + negl′(κ) (28)
Using Eqs. (19) and (21), we have
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 0) = (c1, c2)]
≤ e t2 Pr[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)] (29)
Finally, Eqs. (24) and (29) give us
Pr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 1, 1) = (c1, c2)]| ≤
etPr
[GAPPTFA-OCPA(κ, 0, 1) = (c1, c2)] (30)
Note that the GAPPTIND-FA-OCPA game can abort sometimes (Step
4, when O˜0 and O˜1 do not share any randomized order).
However, this does not lead to any information leakage
to APPT since this step happens before the challenger has
chosen any of the bits {b1, b2}. Additionally, the condition
1b ensures that the event that the game runs to comple-
tion happens with non-zero probability. It is so because
if P0(X00) and P1(X10) share a randomized order, then
Pr
[
O˜0 and O˜1 share a randomized order
]
> 0.
This concludes our proof.
B. Proofs for Thms. 8 and 9
Preliminaries.
Fact 1. If D represents an input distribution and X =
{x1, · · · , xn} denotes a dataset of size n with each data point
sampled i.i.d from D, then we have:
PrD
[
X(i, j) = b
]
=
∑
s∈Sjb
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
where i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], b ∈ {0, 1}, and Sjb = {s|s ∈
X and its j-th bit sj = b}.
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Let C(i) represent the ciphertext with rank i in C.
Additionally, let X ′(i) represent the corresponding plaintext
for C(i). From the IND-FA-OCPA guarantee, we observe
that the rank of a ciphertext y ∈ Y is equal to the rank of
its corresponding plaintext in X , i.e, X ′(i) = X(i). Thus, we
have this, we have
L(i, j) = PrD
[
X ′(i, j) = b(i, j)
]
= PrD
[
X(i, j) = b(i, j)
]
=
∑
s∈Sj
b(i,j)
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
[From Fact 1] (31)
Eqs. 15 and 31 can be numerically computed using the
following lemma.
Lemma 12. If D represents an input distribution and X =
{x1, · · · , xn} denotes a dataset of size n with each data point
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sampled i.i.d from D, then we have:
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
=

n∑
j=n−i+1
(
n
j
) · PrD[x < s]n−j· PrD[x = s]j
if PrD
[
x > s
]
= 0
n∑
j=i
(
n
j
) · PrD[x = s]j · PrD[x > s]n−j
if PrD
[
x < s
]
= 0
n∑
j=1
(
min{i,n−j+1}∑
k=max{1,i−j+1}
((
n
k−1,j,n−k−i+1
)·
PrD
[
x < s
]k−1 · PrD[x = s]j ·
PrD
[
x > s
]n−k−j+1)) otherwise
where x ∼ D, i ∈ [n] and s ∈ X .
Proof. Let Xsort denote the sorted version of X . Additionally,
let rfs and r
l
s denote the positions of the first and last
occurrences of the value s in Xsort, respectively. Let cnts
denote the count of data points with value s in X . Thus, clearly
cnts = r
l
s − rfs + 1
Case I: PrD
[
x > s
]
= 0
In this case, we have
X(i) = s =⇒ X(r) = s,∀r s.t i ≤ r ≤ n
Thus, rls = n and n− i+ 1 ≤ cnts ≤ n and
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
=
n∑
j=n−i+1
PrD
[
X(i) = s|cnts = j
]
=
n∑
j=n−i+1
(
n
j
)
· PrD
[
x < s
]n−j · PrD[x = s]j
Case II: PrD
[
x < s
]
= 0
In this case, we have
X(i) = s =⇒ X(r) = s,∀r s.t 1 ≤ r ≤ i
Thus, rfs = 1 and therefore i ≤ cnts ≤ n and
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
=
n∑
j=i
PrD
[
X(i) = s|cnts = j
]
=
n∑
j=i
(
n
j
)
· PrD
[
x = s
]j · PrD[x > s]n−j
Case III: Otherwise
For all other cases, if cnts = j, j ∈ [n], then we must have
max{1, i− j + 1} ≤ rls ≤ min{i, n− j + 1}. Thus, we have
PrD
[
X(i) = s
]
=
n∑
j=1
PrD
[
X(i) = s|cnts = j
]
=
n∑
j=1
(
min{i,n−j+1}∑
k=max{1,i−j+1}
(( n
k − 1, j, n− k − i+ 1
)
·
PrD
[
x < s
]k−1 · PrD[x = s]j · PrD[x > s]n−k−j+1))
Proof for Thm. 9
Proof. Recall that in OP, the OPE scheme is applied to the
encodings obtained from the OPc primitive. Thus, in this
case, the ciphertexts C preserve the rank of the encodings of
OPc(x,P, ), x ∈ X . Let O˜ represent this set of encodings.
Additionally, let O˜(i) be the encoding in O˜ with rank i. Let
X ′′(i) represent the corresponding plaintext for the encoding
O˜(i). Thus, for s ∈ X , x ∼ D and o ∼ D∗, we have
PrD
[
X ′′(i) = s
]
=∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
] · PrD[X ′′(i) = s|O˜(i) = v]
=
∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
] · PrD[x = s|OPc(x,P, ) = v]
=
∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
]·
PrD
[
OPc(x,P, ) = v|x = s] · PrD[x = s]
PrD
[
OPc(x,P, ) = v]
=
∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
]·
PrD
[
OPc(x,P, ) = v|x = s] · PrD[x = s]
PrD∗
[
o = v
]
= PrD
[
x = s
]∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
]Pr[OPc(s,P, ) = v]
PrD∗
[
o = v
]
Thus finally,
L(i, j) = Pr[X ′′(i, j) = b(i, j)]
=
∑
s∈Sj
b(i,j)
Pr
[
X ′′(i) = s
]
=
∑
s∈Sj
b(i,j)
PrD
[
x = s
](∑
v∈O
PrD∗
[
O˜(i) = v
]·
Pr
[
OPc(s,P, ) = v]/PrD∗[o = v] )
C. Proofs for Lems. 2 and 3
Proof for Lem. 2
Proof. Let x ∈ Xi, i ∈ [k].
Case I. dj , 1 ≤ j < i − 1, i ∈ [2, k] In this case, we have
dj < di−1. Thus,
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oi−1
]
> Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oj
]
(32)
Case II. dj s.t. i+ 1 < j ≤ k, i ∈ [k − 2]
In this case, we have di+1 < dj . Thus,
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oi+1
]
> Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oj
]
(33)
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Proof for Lem. 3
Proof. The proof is presented as follows. For all x ∈ X and
oi ∈ O = {o1, · · · , ok}, we have
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oi]
Pr
[
OPc(x+ t,P, ) = oi
] =
(
e|x+t−di|−|x−di|·/2 ·
k∑
j=1
e−|x+t−dj |·/2
k∑
j=1
e−|x−dj |·/2
)
≤ et/2 · et/2[
∵ |x− dj |+ t ≤ |x+ t− dj | ≤ |x− dj |+ t
]
= et (34)
Similarly,
Pr
[
OPc(x,P, ) = oi]
Pr
[
OPc(x+ t,P, ) = oi
] ≥ et
This concludes our proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. Let X′ be a vector such that X′(i) represents the true
count of the value i ∈ [m]. Thus, we have
E
[
X(i)
]
= E
[ n∑
j=1
A−1(i, j) ·Y(j)]
=
n∑
j=1
A−1(i, j) · E[Y(j))]
=
n∑
j=1
A−1(i, j) · ( n∑
k=1
X′(k) · Pr[OPc(k,X , ) = j])
=
n∑
j=1
A−1(i, j) · ( n∑
k=1
X′(k) ·A(j, k))
=
n∑
j=1
X′(j) · (
n∑
k=1
A−1(i, k) ·A(k, j))
= X′(i)
This concludes the proof.
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